“Slow and Steady Doesn’t Always Win the Race” – Applicability of a Statute of Repose on Indemnity/Contribution Claims in New Hampshire

Rahul Gogineni | The Subrogation Strategist | September 12, 2019

In Rankin v. South Street Downtown Holdings, Inc.2019 N.H. LEXIS 165, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire considered, pursuant to a question transferred by the trial court, whether RSA 508:4-b, the statute of repose for improvements to real property, applies to indemnity and contribution claims. The court concluded that based upon the plain reading of the statute, it applies to indemnity and contribution claims. As noted by the court, a holding to the contrary would violate the intent of a statute of repose, which is to establish a time limit for when a party is exposed to liability.

In Rankin, after falling and injuring himself while leaving a building, John Rankin and his wife brought an action against the property owner, South Street Downtown Holding, Inc. (South Street) in 2017. South Street subsequently filed a third-party complaint against multiple parties including an architectural company, Wagner Hodgson, Inc. (Wagner), who was involved in a renovation project at the property. The project was substantially complete in 2009. Wagner responded by moving to dismiss the action, arguing that South Street’s indemnification and contribution claims were barred by the applicable statute of repose.

RSA 508:4-b specifically states,

Except as otherwise provided in this section, all actions to recover damages for injury to property, injury to the person, wrongful death or economic loss arising out of any deficiency in the creation of an improvement to real property, including without limitation the design, labor, materials, engineering, planning, surveying, construction, observation, supervision or inspection of that improvement, shall be brought within 8 years from the date of substantial completion of the improvement, and not thereafter. (Emphasis added).

After reviewing the basis of South Street’s claims against Wagner, the court concluded that South Street’s indemnification and contribution claims specifically fell within the statute of repose. In so doing, the court reaffirmed its prior holdings that indemnity and contribution actions are actions to recover economic loss. It then concluded that because there was no exception in the section for indemnity and contribution actions, they both fell squarely within the meaning of the phrase “all actions.” Having found that the statute of repose was applicable to South Street’s claims, the court answered the transferred question in the affirmative.

This case serves as a good reminder that contribution and/or indemnification claims may be governed not only by a different subset of laws within respective jurisdictions but also by the terms of any applicable time limitation statutes. As such, practitioners should be aware that merely because an indemnity or contribution statute does not discuss either a statute of limitation or a statute of repose, such limitations may still apply to their claims. Moreover, just because a statute of limitations and/or repose does not specifically mention indemnity or contribution claims, does not mean they are exempt from the statute.

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