Recent Court Order Excluding Expert Testimony Offers Useful Reminders and Lessons for Construction Litigants

Amandeep S. Kahlon | Bradley Arant Boult Cummings

Construction claims often feature supporting testimony from design and/or scheduling experts, and exclusion of that testimony either by disqualification of the expert or a finding that the testimony is otherwise inadmissible can prove fatal to your claim or defense. States may vary in their requirements for admissibility of expert evidence, but most states follow some variant of Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Rule 702 provides that an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) The testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) The expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

The recent district court order in American Contractors Indemnity Co. v. Reflectech, Inc. granting a motion to strike an expert demonstrates the importance of satisfying the requirements for admission of expert evidence under Rule 702 and other like statutes. In that case, a surety sought indemnity for payment on bonds issued to a subcontractor that defaulted on a roofing subcontract. The surety investigated the general contractor’s claim for default against the subcontractor, settled with the general contractor for approximately $400,000, and then filed suit against the subcontractor for breach of their general indemnity agreement.

The defendant subcontractor proffered an expert to opine on the adequacy of the surety’s investigation and the appropriateness of payment of the general contractor’s bond claims. In moving to strike this expert, the surety argued (1) the expert should be disqualified due to lack of experience, and (2) the expert testimony was inadmissible because it was not based on sufficient facts or data as required under Rule 702(b). The court focused on the second prong of the surety’s argument in granting the motion to strike.  The court found that the expert’s opinion was not based on sufficient facts or data because of several admissions from the expert during his deposition. Specifically, the surety persuaded the court with the following facts derived from the expert’s deposition testimony:

  • The expert admitted he never visited the project site and interviewed only one individual, the owner of the subcontractor, before drafting his expert report;
  • The expert admitted he never reviewed the surety’s records regarding the general contractor’s claim and did not know what information the surety’s investigation uncovered because that information was never provided to him;
  • The expert testified that the surety’s records would have been helpful in forming his expert opinion (the subcontractor was unable to provide any explanation for failure to provide this material to the expert when it had been produced by the surety); and
  • The expert stated that he did not review the settlement portion of the general indemnity agreement, which he had opined was unconscionable.

The facts relied upon by the court highlight the importance of selecting and managing experts in construction disputes. When selecting an expert, a party should be mindful of the expert’s prior testifying experience and his or her approach to investigating a claim or subject area for which an opinion is required. A party should also ensure its expert receives and reviews all the documents and information necessary to formulate his or her opinion. To be successful, this process requires an active dialogue with the expert throughout the course of a matter.  For example, document productions from other parties and deposition testimony from witnesses will uncover additional information an expert may need to support his or her opinions. Consistent engagement with an expert will help avoid outcomes such as that encountered by the roofing subcontractor in this case and should help a party better develop its claims or defenses as a matter proceeds.

Admissibility of Expert Opinions in Insurance Bad Faith Trials

David McLain | Colorado Construction Litigation| October 8, 2019

In 2010, Hansen Construction was sued for construction defects and was defended by three separate insurance carriers pursuant to various primary CGL insurance policies.[i]  One of Hansen’s primary carriers, Maxum Indemnity Company, issued two primary policies, one from 2006-2007 and one from 2007-2008.  Everest National Insurance Company issued a single excess liability policy for the 2007-2008 policy year, and which was to drop down and provide additional coverage should the 2007-2008 Maxum policy become exhausted.  In November 2010, Maxum denied coverage under its 2007-2008 primarily policy but agreed to defend under the 2006-2007 primarily policy.  When Maxum denied coverage under its 2007-2008 primary policy, Everest National Insurance denied under its excess liability policy. 

In 2016, pursuant to a settlement agreement between Hansen Construction and Maxum, Maxum retroactively reallocated funds it owed to Hansen Construction from the 2006-2007 Maxum primary policy to the 2007-2008 Maxum primary policy, which became exhausted by the payment.  Thereafter, Hansen Construction demanded coverage from Everest National, which continued to deny the claim.  Hansen Construction then sued Everest National for, among other things, bad faith breach of contract.

In the bad faith action, both parties retained experts to testify at trial regarding insurance industry standards of care and whether Everest National’s conduct in handling Hansen Construction’s claim was reasonable.  Both parties sought to strike the other’s expert testimony as improper and inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
In striking both sides’ expert opinions, the U.S. District Court Judge Christine Arguello set forth the standards for the admissibility of expert opinions in Federal Court:

Under Daubert, the trial court acts as a “gatekeeper” by reviewing a proffered expert opinion for relevance pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401, and reliability pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.[ii]  The proponent of the expert must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s testimony and opinion are admissible.[iii]  This Court has discretion to evaluate whether an expert is helpful, qualified, and reliable under Rule 702.[iv]

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Rule 702 provides that a witness who is qualified as an expert by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” may testify if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.

In deciding whether expert testimony is admissible, the Court must make multiple determinations. First, it must first determine whether the expert is qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to render an opinion.[v]  Second, if the expert is sufficiently qualified, the Court must determine whether the proposed testimony is sufficiently “relevant to the task at hand,” such that it “logically advances a material aspect of the case.”[vi]  “Doubts about whether an expert’s testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor of admissibility unless there are strong factors such as time or surprise favoring exclusions.”[vii]

Third, the Court examines whether the expert’s opinion “has ‘a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his [or her] discipline.’”[viii]  In determining reliability, a district court must decide “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.”[ix]  In making this determination, a court may consider: “(1) whether a theory has been or can be tested or falsified, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication, (3) whether there are known or potential rates of error with regard to specific techniques, and (4) whether the theory or approach has general acceptance.”[x]

The Supreme Court has made clear that this list is neither definitive nor exhaustive.[xi]  In short, “[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.”[xii]

The requirement that testimony must be reliable does not mean that the party offering such testimony must prove “that the expert is indisputably correct.”[xiii]  Rather, the party need only prove that “the method employed by the expert in reaching the conclusion is scientifically sound and that the opinion is based on facts which sufficiently satisfy Rule 702’s reliability requirements.”[xiv]  Guided by these principles, this Court has “broad discretion” to evaluate whether an expert is helpful, qualified, and reliable under the “flexible” standard of Fed. R. Evid. 702.[xv]

With respect to helpfulness of expert opinions, Judge Arguello explained:

Federal Rule of Evidence 704 allows an expert witness to testify about an ultimate question of fact.[xvi]  To be admissible, however, an expert’s testimony must be helpful to the trier of fact.[xvii]  To ensure testimony is helpful, “[a]n expert may not state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts, but an expert may refer to the law in expressing his or her opinion.”[xviii]

“The line between a permissible opinion on an ultimate issue and an impermissible legal conclusion is not always easy to discern.”[xix]  Permissible testimony provides the jury with the “tools to evaluate an expert’s ultimate conclusion and focuses on questions of fact that are amenable to the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the expert’s field.”[xx]

However, “an expert may not simply tell the jury what result it should reach….”[xxi]  Further, “expert testimony is not admissible to inform the trier of fact as to the law that it will be instructed to apply to the facts in deciding the case.”[xxii]  Similarly, contract interpretation is not a proper subject for expert testimony.[xxiii]

Finding that all three of the experts intended to offer opinions that were objectionable on the basis of helpfulness, Judge Arguello granted both parties’ motions to exclude the expert testimony of the opposing experts. 


[i] Hansen Construction, Inc. v. Everest National Insurance Company, 2019 WL 2602510 (D. Colo. June 25, 2019).

[ii]See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–95 (1993); see also Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000).

[iii]United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Crabbe, F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1220–21 (D. Colo. 2008); Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory comm. notes.

[iv]See Goebel, 214 F.3d at 1087; United States v. Velarde, 214 F.3d 1204, 1208–09 (10th Cir. 2000).

[v]Nacchio, 555 F.3d at 1241.

[vi]Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 884, 884 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005).

[vii]Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1090 (10th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted).

[viii]Norris, 397 F.3d at 884, 884 n.2 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).

[ix] Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–93).

[x]Norris, 397 F.3d at 884 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94).

[xi]Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 150 (1999).

[xii]Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.

[xiii]Bitler v. A.O. Smith Corp., 400 F.3d 1227, 1233 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mitchell v. Gencorp Inc., 165 F.3d 778, 781 (10th Cir. 1999)).

[xiv] Id.

[xv]Velarde, 214 F.3d at 1208–09; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.

[xvi] United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015).

[xvii] Fed. R. Evid. 702.

[xviii] Richter, 796 F.3d at 1195 (quoting United States v. Bedford, 536 F.3d 1148, 1158 (10th Cir. 2008)); see, e.g., Killion v. KeHE Distribs., LLC, 761 F.3d 574, 592 (6th Cir. 2014) (report by proffered “liability expert,” which read “as a legal brief” exceeded scope of an expert’s permission to “opine on and embrace factual issues, not legal ones.”).

[xix] Richter, 796 F.3d at 1195 (quoting United States v. McIver, 470 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2006)).

[xx] Id. (citing United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1171–72 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Even if [an expert’s] testimony arguably embraced the ultimate issue, such testimony is permissible as long as the expert’s testimony assists, rather than supplants, the jury’s judgment.”)).

[xxi] Id. at 1195–96 (quoting Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1171).

[xxii] 4 Jack B. Weinstein et al., Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 702.03[3] (supp. 2019) (citing, e.g., Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 361–62 (2d Cir. 1992) (expert witnesses may not compete with the court in instructing the jury)).

[xxiii] Id. (citing, e.g., Breezy Point Coop. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Co., 868 F. Supp. 33, 35–36 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (expert witness’s proposed testimony that failure to give timely notice of loss violated terms of insurance policy was inadmissible because it would improperly interpret terms of a contract)). 

How Not to Preserve an Expert Objection for Appeal |

Robert Ambrogi – July 3, 2012

Every lawyer learns in law school that to be able to appeal an issue to a higher court, you must preserve it. No formaldehyde is needed for this, but what is required is that the lawyer clearly raise an objection at trial and get an express ruling from the trial judge.

Sounds easy enough. When objecting to an expert witness, however, a single objection may not suffice to preserve the issue for appeal. If your objection is to both the expert’s qualifications and methodology, you had better be specific about both grounds and secure a ruling that expressly addresses both. Otherwise, your appeal might be lost before it even begins.

That is the lesson of a June 6 opinion from the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. v. Avitia-Guillen. In an appeal of a conviction of a Mexican citizen for unlawfully reentering the United States, the 10th Circuit concluded that defense counsel failed to properly preserve for appeal an objection to the methodology of a fingerprint expert.

When an Objection is Not Enough

Had defense counsel failed to object to the expert, the ruling would be no surprise. In fact, though, defense counsel did object to the expert testifying. The flaw in the objection, the 10th Circuit held, was that it focused on the expert’s qualifications and never mentioned her methodology.

Defense counsel had thought – and argued on appeal – that no specific objection to methodology was necessary. Here is why: In admitting expert testimony, a trial court is expected to consider both the expert’s qualifications and the expert’s methodology. This so-called gatekeeper role is required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and by a long line of cases starting with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. , 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).

Given that the trial court had to rule on both qualifications and methodology in order to admit the expert’s testimony, defense counsel argued, then both issues were preserved for appeal. Not so, the 10th Circuit said. “When no objection is raised, district courts are not required to make ‘explicit on-the-record rulings.’” Rather, it can be assumed that the court performed the required analysis “sub silentio.”

Appeal Challenged Judge’s Gatekeeping Duties

At the trial in this case, after prosecutors called the expert to the witness stand and established a foundation for her testimony, defense counsel cross-examined her. After questioning her about her job duties, training and publications, defense counsel objected to her qualifications. The trial judge overruled the objection and allowed the expert to testify.

On appeal, defense counsel did not directly challenge either the expert’s qualifications or methodology. Instead, counsel argued that the trial court erred “by failing to create an adequate record demonstrating that it satisfied its gatekeeping obligations.”

The only way to decide this issue, the 10th Circuit reasoned, is to look at the trial court’s findings. Absent an objection, however, the trial court was not required to make specific findings. “Where a party objects only to an expert’s qualifications, he does not preserve an objection to the expert’s methodology,” the court said.

Even though the 10th Circuit held that the issue was not properly preserved for appeal, that did not mean it could not be reviewed. Rather, the court explained, when the appeal involves expert testimony, the failure to preserve means that the appellate panel will apply a more relaxed standard of review.

When the objection is properly preserved, the court said, it reviews the lower court’s ruling de novo, as if it were deciding the issue in the first instance. When the objection is not preserved, however, the appellate court reviews the ruling only for “plain error.”

No Error, Circuit Concludes

With regard to the qualifications of the expert in this case, the 10th Circuit held that the issue was properly preserved but that the trial judge “gave ample evidence it was applying the Rule 702 standard.” The judge noted on the record that the expert was qualified based on her “training, education, background and experience,” the circuit panel explained.

As to methodology, however, the failure to preserve the issue for appeal meant that the appeals court was “left to look only for some obvious error in the court’s implicit finding” that the expert’s methodology was reliable. Finding nothing in the record that would indicate that the expert deviated from normal methods of fingerprint analysis, there was no basis to conclude that the trial judge committed plain error, the 10th Circuit held.

Here, then, is a lesson law school never taught: Just because a trial judge is supposed to decide an issue, don’t assume that issue is preserved for appeal. Be explicit in your objection and seek a ruling that answers it directly.

via How Not to Preserve an Expert Objection for Appeal |.