Pollution Exclusion Does Not Apply To Concrete Settling Dust

Tred R. Eyerly | Insurance Law Hawaii | October 24, 2018

Applying Virginia law, the federal district court determined that the pollution exclusion did not bar coverage. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Zenith Aviation, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14727 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2018).

Zenith Aviation, Inc. hired Abby Construction Company to install an elevator at its warehouse. A wet saw was used to cut away concrete, but Abby did not use any water with the wet saw. This created a significant amount of concrete dust to leave the warehouse. Surrounding businesses contacted the fire department because they thought the dust was smoke from a fire. The concrete dust settled inside Zenith’s building, damaging airplane parts stored in the warehouse.

Allied issued to Zenith a commercial insurance policy. Zenith submitted a claim for its loss. The policy’s pollution exclusion barred coverage for the discharge, dispersal, etc. of “pollutants” unless the escape of a “pollutant” was not “caused by any of the ‘specified causes of loss.'” But if the discharge . . . of ‘pollutants’ results in a ‘specified cause of loss,’ we will pay for the loss or damage caused by that ‘specified cause of loss.'” “Pollutants” included any irritant or contaminant, including smoke, chemicals and waste. Finally, “specified causes of loss” were defined as “fire; lightening; explosion; windstorm or hail; smoke . . .”

Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. Allied acknowledged that Zenith suffered a “direct physical loss” that would be covered but for the pollution exclusion. Allied argued that the concrete dust meet the definition of a “pollutant” since it was an “irritant or contaminant.” Zenith contended that cement was not a pollutant and Allied had offered nothing to suggest it was.

The court agreed that concrete dust was a pollutant since it could function as both an “irritant” and a “contaminant.” There was no genuine issue of fact concerning whether the concrete dust “contaminated” Zenith’s products and machinery.

Zenith then argued that the dust was a “specified cause of loss” in the form of “smoke.” The court found the applicable definition of “smoke” as used in the Pollution Exclusion to be unclear, with more than one reasonable definitions. Zenith argued “smoke” could mean a cloud of fine particulate matter. Allied submitted that “smoke” meant “the gaseous products of burning materials” and “suspension of particles in a gas.” With two reasonable definitions, the court construed the ambiguity in favor of the insured. “Smoke” referred to any visible suspension of particles in a gas, including the concrete dust suspended in the air in Zenith’s warehouse.

Allied then argued that even if the concrete dust was “smoke,” it did not “cause” a loss when it merely settled on the airplane parts, contaminating them, because the concrete in the air did not “result in” the dust on the inventory and machinery since it was the dust.

The exceptions to the Pollution Exclusion required a causal nexus between a specified cause of loss and the pollutant. The facts reflected: (1) Abby Construction used a wet saw without water to cut concrete; (2) the saw “released” concrete solids into the air; (3) the dust, rather than falling immediately to the ground, carried into a cloud of particulate, resulting in “smoke;” and (4) the particulate from the cloud of smoke ultimately settled on Zenith’s products and equipment, contaminating them and causing the loss.

Therefore, Zenith’s loss resulted from the dispersal or migration of a pollutant onto its inventory and machinery, and that dispersal or migration was caused by a visible gaseous suspension of the concrete particulate in the air, i.e., smoke. The “dispersal” or “migration” of the concrete dust onto Zenith’s products was therefore “itself caused by” the smoke from which it settled, and therefore the loss fell under the exception to the pollution exclusion. Further, the “discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape” of the concrete dust from the wet saw “resulted in” smoke, a specified cause of loss, which then caused Zenith’s loss.

Allied argued that “smoke” could not simultaneously be both the “pollutant” and the “specified cause of loss.” But the fact that the particles that contaminated Zenith’s products and equipment were the same as the particles that were a constituent part of the “smoke” did not mean that there was no causal separation between the “pollutant” that was dispersed and the “specified cause of the loss” that dispersed it or resulted from it.

Therefore, the court believed that the Supreme Court of Virginia would conclude that the Pollution Exclusion did not apply and that there was coverage under the policy for Zenith’s alleged losses.

It’s Tradition! Pollution Exclusion Applies Only to Traditional Environmental Contamination: New Cases from Washington and Connecticut

Lucas M. Blower | Brouse McDowell | September 17, 2017

In general, a pollution exclusion precludes coverage for liabilities arising from the “discharge, dispersal, release or escape” of “irritants, contaminants or pollutants.” The exclusion was incorporated in commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies in response to the massive environmental liabilities incurred by companies in the 70’s and 80’s.

And the exclusion has been effective, by in large, in precluding coverage for liabilities that are the result of traditional environmental contamination. But, for some insurers, that was not enough. These insurers argued that the pollution exclusion leaches out in new directions, applying not only to traditional environmental contamination, but extending to apply in new, non-pollution contexts as well.

For example, in Andersen v. Highland House Co., 93 Ohio St. 3d 547, 757 N.E.2d 329 (2001), the insurers relied on the pollution exclusion to deny a claim based on carbon monoxide poisoning in an apartment—hardly the sort of widespread environmental damage first envisioned by the pollution exclusion. The insurer nonetheless argued that the pollution exclusion applied because carbon monoxide was a “pollutant,” which the policy defined as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.” Id. at 548. The Ohio Supreme Court, however, disagreed, holding that the pollution exclusion would not apply because it did not “specifically, and unambiguously state that coverage for residential carbon monoxide poisoning is excluded.” Id. at 548. According to the Court, the pollution exclusion was limited to situations involving “traditional environmental contamination.” Id. at 552.

While insurers have been rebuffed in their efforts to expand the scope of the pollution exclusion in Ohio, in other states, they continue to push at the edges of the pollution exclusion, hoping to spread its reach past the confines of traditional environmental contamination. But, in two recent cases—from Washington and Connecticut—the courts rightly halted the insurer’s attempts to expand the exclusion.

The recent decision from Washington’s Supreme Court, in Zhaoyun Xia v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co. RRG, 393 P.3d 748, 750 (Wash. 2017), mirrors Andersen in the facts, and reaches the same conclusion, but by a slightly different route. The underlying claim in Xia was based on the “negligent installation of a hot water heater that led to the release of toxic levels of carbon monoxide in a residential home.” The insurer denied the claim based on the pollution exclusion.

In interpreting the pollution exclusion, the Xia court, similar to the Andersen court, recognized that the pollution exclusion should only apply when the underlying cause of alleged liability “stems from either a traditional environmental harm or a pollutant acting as a pollutant.” Id. at 753. Unlike the Andersen court, however, the Xia court found that the carbon monoxide poisoning could be characterized as pollution. Still, the Xia court found that the insurer’s interpretation of the pollution exclusion violated Washington’s efficient proximate cause rule. Under that rule, a loss is covered, even if there are uncovered events within the causal chain leading to that loss, so long as the initial event—or the “efficient proximate cause”—is a covered peril. In Xia, the court found that the efficient proximate cause of the loss was the negligent installation of the hot water heater, which was covered. Accordingly, the pollution exclusion did not apply.

In Connecticut, likewise, an appellate court addressed a case where the insurer was arguing for an expansive version of the pollution exclusion. In R.T. Vanderbilt Co., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 156 A.3d 539 (Conn. App. 2017), the policyholder was accused of mining and selling industrial talc that contained asbestos, which allegedly injured a host of claimants. The policyholder submitted a claim based on the lawsuits to its insurers, which denied the claims, in part, based on the pollution exclusion. The Connecticut appellate court disagreed with the insurers’ interpretation of the exclusion after an exacting review of the policy language. According to the court, the “policy language, when read as a whole, is intended to exclude coverage only for traditional environmental pollution, such as the intentional disposal or negligent release of industrial and other hazardous waste into the public air, land, or water resources.” Id. at 638. Since talc mining didn’t count as traditional environmental pollution, the court held that the pollution exclusion did not apply.

These two cases, and many others like them, should give insurers pause when they argue for a broad application of the pollution exclusion in non-traditional settings. Even if the terms in the pollution exclusion, standing alone, may seem broad enough to encompass ever new risks, the courts have rightly decided that they will not read the terms of the pollution exclusion standing alone. Rather, courts will continue their long-standing practice of interpreting the pollution exclusion solely within the limited context in which it was written. It’s tradition.

Poisoning the Well: Washington Supreme Court Applies Efficient Proximate Cause to Eviscerate Pollution Exclusion in Liability Policy

Meredith Whigham Caiafa | PropertyCasualtyFocus | July 7, 2017

Professionals and practitioners in first party property insurance are likely familiar with the efficient proximate cause rule, which requires an insurance policy to provide coverage where “a covered peril sets in motion a causal chain,” even if subsequent causes-in-fact of the loss are excluded by the policy. As indicated by our previous coverage [123] of this doctrine, this can be a confusing analysis that leads to unpredictable results.

Until recently, the efficient proximate cause rule has only been applied to first party insurance policies. But this is no longer the case, at least in the state of Washington. In Xia, et al. v. ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, et al., Case No. 92436-8 (April 27, 2017), the Washington Supreme Court held that, due to the efficient proximate cause rule, a pollution exclusion in a CGL policy did not apply to a claim for bodily injury from carbon monoxide inhalation, because the release of the pollutant was caused by negligence. Moreover, the consequences of the insurer’s failure to consider efficient proximate cause were severe; despite no precedent for the application of this rule to a liability policy, the court also held that the insurer acted in bad faith by failing to defend the claim based on efficient proximate cause.

In Xia, the claimant bought a house constructed by Issaquah Highlands 48 LLC (“Issaquah”), which had a CGL policy issued by ProBuilders. Soon after moving in to the home, the claimant became sick due to inhalation of carbon monoxide. The release of the carbon monoxide was caused by improper installation of an exhaust vent.

After Issaquah notified ProBuilders of the claim, ProBuilders denied coverage under the policy’s pollution exclusion, which excluded, in pertinent part:

Bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury caused by, resulting from, attributable to, contributed to, or aggravated by the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of pollutants, or from the presence of, or exposure to, pollution of any form whatsoever, and regardless of the cause of the pollution or pollutants.

This Exclusion applies regardless of the cause of the pollution and whether any other cause of said bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury acted jointly, concurrently, or in any sequence with said pollutants or pollution. This Exclusion applies whether any other cause of the bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury would otherwise be covered under this insurance.

After receiving a $2 million judgment and an assignment of the claim against ProBuilders from Issaquah, the claimant filed a declaratory judgment action against ProBuilders for breach of contract and bad faith. ProBuilders won summary judgment on a different exclusion in the trial court, which the Washington Court of Appeals rejected. However, the appellate court affirmed the judgment on the alternative ground that the pollution exclusion applied.

The Washington Supreme Court took up the issue of whether the pollution exclusion applied to relieve the insurer of its duty to defend. Ultimately, the court held that although the insurer did not err in determining that the plain language of its pollution exclusion applied to the release of carbon monoxide into Xia’s home, because the efficient proximate cause of the claimant’s loss was a covered peril – the negligent installation of a hot water heater – the pollution exclusion could not bar coverage despite its clear application to the facts of the case.

The court summarily dismissed any claim that efficient proximate cause had not previously applied to third party policies, stating:

We have never before suggested that the rule of efficient proximate cause is limited to any one particular type of insurance policy. Instead, the rule has broad application whenever a covered occurrence under the policy-whatever that may be-is determined to be the efficient proximate cause of the loss.

Having established that the efficient proximate cause rule applied, the court held that the fact that the pollution exclusion unambiguously applied did not matter, because the underlying complaints alleged that the release of the pollutant was caused by negligence. Further:

If ProBuilders sought to avoid liability for damages resulting from particular acts of negligence, it certainly could have written specific exclusions to that effect-for instance, an exclusion for acts of negligence relating to the installation of home fixtures generally or hot water heaters specifically. . . . Such an exclusion may have been foreseeable given that this policy was for the construction of a new home, but no such exclusion is found in this insurance policy. Issaquah Highlands paid valuable premiums for an insurance policy providing broad coverage for all forms of negligence except those acts specifically excluded, and it was a covered act of negligence that was the efficient proximate cause of Xia’s loss.

The court accordingly granted judgment as a matter of law to the claimant on both breach of contract and bad faith.

The key to the court’s reasoning appears to be in its statement that “[h]aving received valuable premiums for protection against harm caused by negligence, an insurer may not avoid liability merely because an excluded peril resulted from the initial covered peril.” The Xia decision essentially establishes a rule that, regardless of the type of policy, insurers cannot draft exclusions that will be upheld “when two or more perils combine in sequence to cause a loss and a covered peril is the predominant or efficient cause of the loss.”

Two dissenting justices took issue with the majority decision’s extension of the application of the efficient proximate cause rule to CGL policies, and the finding of bad faith when no other case prior to this one had ever applied the efficient proximate cause rule to CGL policies.

Already known as an unkind venue to insurers, the Xia decision demonstrates that, at least in the state of Washington, insurers cannot be confident that clear and unambiguous policy exclusions will be upheld (at least in multi-peril situations), and should be wary of drawing distinctions in the application of legal doctrines based on the type of insurance policy at issue.


Washington Supreme Court Applies Efficient Proximate Cause Test to Pollution Exclusion

Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP | May 2, 2017

In its recent decision in Xia v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co. RRG, 2017 Wash. LEXIS 443 (Wash. Apr. 27, 2017), the Supreme Court of Washington had occasion to address the concept of efficient proximate cause as it relates to the application of a pollution exclusion.

At issue in Xia was ProBuilders’ coverage obligation under a general liability policy for an underlying claim involving a hot water heater in a new home constructed by its insured.  An exhaust vent for the heater had not been properly installed, thus allowing for carbon monoxide to be released directly into the home and causing injury to the home purchaser.  ProBuilders denied coverage to its insured on the basis of its policy’s pollution exclusion, as well as on the basis of another exclusion not at issue on appeal.

The Court began its analysis by looking to its prior case law concerning the pollution exclusion, in particular its decisions in Cook v. Evanson, 920 P.2d 1223 (1996), Kent Farms, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 969 P.2d 109 (1998), and Quadrant Corp. v. American States Insurance Co., 110 P.3d 733 (2005).  Through these decisions, the Court limited application of the pollution exclusion to traditional environmental harms or to harms inflicted on persons as a result of pollutants acting as pollutants.

In Kent Farms, the Court held that the exclusion was inapplicable where an individual was injured as a result of being sprayed by diesel fuel whereas in Quadrant, the Court held the exclusion applied to a claim involving alleged injuries resulting from decking sealant.  The Court harmonized these cases by noting that in Kent Farms, the claimant was not injured as a result from the diesel fuel acting as a pollutant, but instead from the force and impact of the spray. By contrast, in Quadrant, the claimant was injured as a result of the toxicity of the sealant.  As the Court noted:

As discussed in Quadrant, the facts in Kent Farms did not result in a pollutant acting as a pollutant in such a way that would trigger the pollution exclusion. If the diesel fuel in Kent Farms had been replaced with water, for example, the liquid would still have struck, choked, and engulfed the victim just as surely as the diesel fuel—albeit with less severe consequences. As this court noted, the toxic nature of the pollutant was not central to the event that triggered coverage under the insurance policy. Id.

With this context in mind, the Court agreed that the underlying claim in Xia, involving injuries as the result of exposure to carbon monoxide, could come within the pollution exclusion.  The Court nevertheless observed that per the rule of efficient proximate cause, when a “covered peril” sets in motion a causal chain, the last link of which is an “uncovered peril,” then there is coverage under the policy.  The Court reasoned that this analysis should apply in the context of a general liability policy if a covered “occurrence” gives rise to a loss that might otherwise be excluded.  The Court noted, however, that there are limitations to this rule:

… the efficient proximate clause rule applies only “when two or more perils combine in sequence to cause a loss and a covered peril is the predominant or efficient cause of the loss.” … It is perfectly acceptable for insurers to write exclusions that deny coverage when an excluded occurrence initiates the causal chain and is itself either the sole proximate cause or the efficient proximate cause of the loss.

But such an exclusion, explained the Court, cannot overcome the efficient proximate cause rule.  The Court reasoned that the non-standard pollution exclusion in ProBuilders’ policy applicable to any harm “regardless of the cause of the pollution and whether any other cause of said bodily injury, property damage, or persona injury acted jointly, concurrently, or in any sequence with said pollutants or pollution” was improperly broad since it would have circumvented the efficient proximate cause rule.  The Court, therefore, held that this causation language was unenforceable.

With this in mind, the Court turned to the question of what was the efficient proximate cause of the underlying claim.  The Court observed that the underlying suit alleged that the carbon monoxide resulted from the improper installation of the hot water heater’s venting, which in and of itself would be a covered “occurrence” under ProBuilders’ policy.

ProBuilders’ argued that the Court’s application of the efficient proximate cause rule would essentially negate the pollution exclusion, since all acts of pollution can be traced to an accident or an instance of negligence that could qualify as an “occurrence” under a general liability policy.  The Court did not agree, observing that when the pollution event is the first step in the chain of causation leading to the injury, such as application of flooring sealant, then the pollution exclusion will apply.  The Court further reasoned that ProBuilders could have drafted a more specific exclusion applicable to the occurrence giving rise to the pollution, such as an exclusion applicable to installation of home fixtures of hot water heaters, which would have avoided the efficient proximate cause rule.

In summing up its decision, the Court explained:

Pollution exclusion clauses are an important tool for insurers to avoid liability stemming from loss caused by pollutants acting as pollutants where the insured has paid no premiums for such coverage. However, emphasis must be given to the phrase “caused by.” The efficient proximate cause rule continues to serve the underlying purpose of insurance policies and applies just as effectively to these facts as it has in prior cases. We hold that the efficient proximate cause of Xia’s loss was a covered peril: the negligent installation of a hot water heater. Although ProBuilders correctly applied the language of its pollution exclusion to the release of carbon monoxide in Xia’s home, ProBuilders breached its duty to defend in the face of an alleged covered occurrence that was the efficient proximate cause of the loss.

The Court therefore held that ProBuilders improperly breached its duty to defend, and did so in bad faith.

Pollution Exclusion Precluded Coverage for Claims Arising from Alleged Carbon Monoxide Poisoning, Oregon District Court Rules

Steven A. Meyerowitz | Law.com | March 21, 2017

A federal district court in Oregon has ruled that carbon monoxide was a “pollutant” as defined in a commercial general liability (“CGL”) insurance policy such that the policy’s pollution exclusion served to exclude coverage for claims arising from alleged carbon monoxide poisoning.

The Case

Lawsuits filed in an Oregon state court against Victory Construction LLC, dba Premier Pools and Spas of Oregon, and Vitaly Shavlovskiy (together, “Victory Construction”) alleged negligence in the installation and ventilation of a natural gas swimming pool heater and negligence in failing to warn of the risks of carbon monoxide poisoning associated with operating the heater in an insufficiently ventilated area.

The state court lawsuits alleged that, as a result of Victory Construction’s negligence, excessive carbon monoxide filled the home and caused the plaintiffs to be sick. The complaints sought damages resulting from the release of carbon monoxide from the heater.

Victory Construction sought defense and indemnity from Colony Insurance Company, which had issued a CGL policy to Victory Construction.

Colony Insurance contended that the policy’s pollution exclusion precluded coverage for the claims against Victory Construction arising from the alleged carbon monoxide poisoning, and went to court seeking a determination to that effect.

The Colony Insurance Policy

The Colony Insurance policy’s pollution exclusion provided that the policy did not apply to:

(1) “Bodily injury,” “property damage,” or “personal and advertising injury” which would not have occurred in whole or part but for the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape of “hazardous materials” at any time.

It defined:

hazardous materials


“pollutants,” lead, asbestos, silica and materials containing them

It defined:



any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste

The District Court’s Decision

The district court, applying Oregon law, granted Colony Insurance’s motion, finding that the “only plausible interpretation” of the policy’s terms resulted in the conclusion that carbon monoxide was “a pollutant.”

Accordingly, the district court held, the pollution exclusion applied to damages caused by carbon monoxide.

In its decision, the district court explained that the pollution exclusion excluded coverage for injury or damage caused by “irritants” or “contaminants” – terms, the district court noted, that the policy did not define.

It then ruled that, based on a “plain meaning analysis,” carbon monoxide was either an “irritant” or “contaminant” and, thus, was a “pollutant” under the policy.

Therefore, the district court concluded, Colony Insurance did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Victory Construction.

The case is Colony Ins. Co. v. Victory Construction LLC, No. 3:16–cv–00457–HZ (D. Ore. March 9, 2017). Attorneys involved include: Andrew C. Lauersdorf, MALONEY LAUERSDORF REINER, PC, 1111 E. Burnside St., Ste. 300, Portland, OR 97214, Attorney for Plaintiff. Christopher B. Rounds, ROUNDS LAW OFFICE PC, 1409 Franklin St., No. 217, Vancouver, WA 98660, Attorney for Defendants.

FC&S Legal Comment

Many other courts also have concluded that carbon monoxide was a “pollutant” for purposes of an insurance policy’s pollution exclusion. See, Claudia G. Catalano, What Constitutes “Pollutant,” “Contaminant,” “Irritant,” or “Waste” Within Meaning of Absolute or Total Pollution Exclusion in Liability Insurance Policy,” 98 A.L.R. 5th 193 (2002) (electronic version updated weekly) (collecting cases). See also, e.g., Church Mut. Ins. Co. v. Clay Ctr. Christian Church, 746 F.3d 375 (8th Cir. 2014) (predicting that the Nebraska Supreme Court would conclude that carbon monoxide was a pollutant because it was a gas that could render air “unfit for use” if introduced at high levels); Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc., 677 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that some courts have found the pollution exclusion “clear and unambiguous when applied to carbon monoxide poisoning”); Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Country Oaks Apartments Ltd., 566 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[i]t could not be clearer” that carbon monoxide is a pollutant under the exclusion and rejecting the argument that “a substance must generally or usually act as an irritant or contaminant to constitute a ‘pollutant’”); Longaberger Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 201 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished decision) (affirming district court holding that carbon monoxide is a pollutant); Shaw v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 6:15–CV–686–ORL–TBS (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2016), reconsideration denied, No. 6:15–CV–686–ORL–TBS (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016) (“while carbon monoxide is a naturally occurring gas that is present in the air we breathe, it is also an irritant, contaminant, and toxic at the level of concentration experienced by the [plaintiffs.] Therefore, carbon monoxide clearly and unambiguously fits within the definition of a ‘pollutant’ under the Policy.”); Midwest Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. 2013) (“While there may be substances that are difficult to establish as ‘pollutants’ for purposes of the absolute pollution exclusion, carbon monoxide is not one of them.”).

Other courts, it also should be noted, have reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Apana v. TIG Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 679 (9th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).