Monthly Archives: September 2017

Insurance Coverage for Construction Defect Claims

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Gabrielle T. Kelly | Brouse McDowell | September 22, 2017

Good news for businesses in the construction industry: South Dakota has become the latest jurisdiction to hold that construction defect claims are covered by commercial general liability (CGL) policies. In Owners Insurance Company v. Tibke Construction, Inc., et al., the South Dakota Supreme Court held that an alleged failure to conduct soil testing was an occurrence that triggered coverage under the insured’s CGL policies. In Tibke, the policyholder, Tibke Construction (“Tibke”), was hired as a general contractor to build a house. Tibke, in turn, hired Jerry’s Excavating, Inc. as a subcontractor to prepare the soil and perform excavation work. Several years after Tibke completed the house, the homeowners sued Tibke because of cracking and structural unsoundness in the home that they allege resulted from a failure to conduct soil compaction testing before construction.

Tibke sought coverage for the lawsuit from its insurer, Owners Insurance Company (“Owners”). Owners accepted the claim under a reservation of rights, and then filed a declaratory judgment action against its insured to determine coverage. Owners asserted that faulty construction was not an occurrence under the policies, and that the “Your Work” exclusion precluded coverage for the claim. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the question of coverage. The trial court denied both motions on the grounds that there were questions of fact that still needed to be decided. The parties filed immediate petitions for appeal that the Court granted.

After hearing the arguments by both parties, the Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment denying Owners’ motion and reversed the judgment denying Tibke’s motion. The Court held that a deliberate action, such as faulty work, performed negligently is an accident if the effect is not the expected or intended result. Accordingly, the allegations, if true, constituted an occurrence under the insured’s CGL policy. The Court also rejected Owners’ argument that the “Your Work” exclusion precluded coverage. Because the exclusion focused on the repair, restoration, or replacement of a specific part of the property, the Court found that the policy did not preclude coverage where the whole house suffered damage for work performed on the soil beneath it.

What’s the takeaway for policyholders? Courts are analyzing the policy language and fixating on whether the result was an ‘accident’. In fact, a majority of state supreme courts who have decided this issue have ruled that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence. Thus, policyholders need to carefully review their policy language and not rely solely on their insurance company to tell them whether a construction defect claim is covered by their policies.

1st Circuit Pending Appeal – Construction Contract Defenses & Miller Act

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Katherine E. Kohm | The Dispute Resolver | September 26, 2017

In Endicott Constructors Corp. v. E. Amanti & Sons, Inc., No. 1:14-CV-12807-LTS, 2017 WL 3028877 (D. Mass. July 14, 2017), the plaintiff-subcontractor Endicott Constructors Corp. (“Plaintiff”) filed a lawsuit claiming breach of contract and quantum meruit against the defendant-general contractor E. Amanti & Sons, Inc. (“Defendant Contractor”) on a construction renovation project at a Veterans Affairs building in Bedford, Massachusetts. Plaintiff also brought a claim against Safeco Insurance of America (“Defendant Surety”) pursuant to the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3133.  The two Defendants moved for summary judgment against Plaintiff’s claims. The District of Massachusetts granted the motions. Plaintiff is now appealing the decision to the First Circuit.

Though factually detailed, the decision serves as a review of numerous key concepts in construction law including the requirement of strict performance to recover on a contract breach, requirement of substantial performance to recover under quantum meruit, cardinal change, necessity of expert testimony, contractual notice provisions, and tolling applicable to the Miller Act statute of limitations.

  • The Court held that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, show “complete and strict performance of all its terms” because Plaintiff walked off the project with 1/3 of the subcontract to complete, and therefore could not recover on the contract itself.
  • Moreover, in addition to walking off the job, Plaintiff acknowledged, inter alia, that it performed defective work and did not pay federally-required wages.  Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, “did not substantially perform its contract obligations” which extinguished its claim for “quantum meruit” as well.
  • To avoid this harsh result on its contract-based claims, Plaintiff argued that a “cardinal change” had occurred excusing its performance.  The Court hesitated to confirm that Massachusetts has adopted this doctrine, but in any event, held that the elements of a cardinal change were not present. The Court observed that there must be “alteration in the work [effected by the government] so drastic that it effectively requires the contractor to perform duties materially different from those originally bargained for.”  Here, because Plaintiff only pointed to the government adding supervisory personnel to its payroll and a large number of change orders, the Court was not persuaded that Plaintiff’s scope was “drastically altered.” Indeed that court emphasized that, In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 456 (1st Cir. 1989) the court had held that even 86 change orders was not sufficient to show a cardinal change to construction contract.
  • With respect to Plaintiff’s extended time claim, the Court, in dicta, questioned whether an expert is required to prove such a delay claim, but also noted that Plaintiff’s failure to do so may be at its peril as it had not presented a “coherent analysis” to allow a factfinder to could find in its favor.
  • Adding to Plaintiff’s challenges, it failed to present evidence that it had given notice of its claims within 7 days as required by the contract. The Court, without delving into whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay, succinctly held that failure to comply with the contractual provision “will generally preclude all relief.”
  • With respect to the Miller Act action that Plaintiff filed on the bond provided by Defendant Surety, the Court was not persuaded that presence of Plaintiff’s trailers on the construction site would extend limitations period.  The Miller Act requires that any action on the bond must be brought within one year of the “last of the labor was performed or material was supplied” by the contractor or supplier bringing the action.
If the First Circuit has an opportunity to weigh in, the law in these areas, as recounted above, may be further honed by its decision. If so, we will update this blog.

Fourth Circuit Finds No Bad Faith for Delay in Investigating Construction Defect Claim

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James W. Bryan | Nexsen Pruet | September 12, 2017

Construction defect claims often include coverage disputes spiced with allegations of bad faith designed to turn up the heat on the insurer. The Fourth Circuit, in its review of one such recent North Carolina case, held while the insured prevailed on its contract claim, there was no bad faith. Delay, without other, aggravating factors is not enough to establish the malice or reckless indifference to consequences necessary to reach the level of bad faith. Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Clancy & Theys Construction Co., 683 Fed.Appx. 259 (4th Cir. 2017).

Westchester involved a dispute over insurance coverage for a general contractor’s liability for defective design of a building foundation. A joint venture, in which Clancy was a partner, was hired to construct a mid-rise student housing building in Raleigh, North Carolina. In September 2011, after construction was well under way, a portion of the building began to lean, damaging other portions of the building. The owner demanded a remedy that would result in no risk to it, or its lender. Following agreement on a repair plan, the joint venture initiated a mediation process with potentially responsible subcontractors seeking allocation of the $14.4 million repair costs. This resulted in agreement that 10.5 million would be paid on behalf of subcontractors, leaving the remaining damages to be absorbed by the joint venture. Clancy sought reimbursement of its share from Westchester under general and professional liability policies.

Upon receiving the owner’s demand for repair in September 2011, Clancy notified Westchester of the potential claim. Clancy was unable to contact the Westchester representative assigned to the claim who, unbeknownst to Clancy, had left the employ of Westchester. After about a month, Clancy established contact with another Westchester employee assigned to the claim. After providing all of the communications between Clancy and the owner, Westchester was silent for another two months. As Clancy pressed for a coverage determination, Westchester requested an accounting of costs and a copy of the joint venture agreement, all of which Clancy provided. Eventually, in May 2012, Westchester informed Clancy it believed its policy did not cover Clancy’s obligations for the construction damages but it was not issuing a formal denial of coverage. Indeed, three months later, Westchester stated it was still investigating the coverage issue. In September, 2012, Clancy complained of Westchester’s year long delay and threatened suit. In response, Westchester filed its action for a declaratory judgment that its policy afforded no coverage. Clancy counterclaimed alleging Westchester’s breach of contract and tortious breach of contract based upon Westchester’s failure to timely investigate, failure to timely issue a coverage opinion, failure to properly defend, failure to assist in mitigating damages, and failure to indemnify for covered losses. Clancy also alleged Westchester acted in willful, wanton disregard of its duty to defend and indemnify, entitling Clancy to extra-contractual damages.

In May 2014, the district court denied summary judgment for either party on the contract dispute but entered summary judgment for Westchester on Clancy’s claim for bad faith tortious breach of contract, finding “in order to recover for tortious breach of an insurance contract, an insured must show that the refusal to pay on the insurance contract was based not on honest disagreement or innocent mistake, but rather on ‘malice, oppression, willfulness and reckless indifference to consequences.’”

The district court concluded

Though there is much dispute present in the record regarding when and whether Clancy notified Westchester of a claim against it, the record does not support that Westchester acted with malice, oppression, or a reckless indifference to consequences. Where courts have found that a refusal to settle an insurance claim was an act of bad faith there has been ample evidence to show not only delay in investigation but also other aggravating factors such as the offer of a woefully low settlement amount, reliance on estimation of damage and repairs submitted by a clearly unqualified professional, and evidence that the insurance company “stirred up hate and discontent” against its insured by making false accusations regarding the insured’s participation in the loss…While the record certainly reflects that Westchester does not think Clancy is entitled to indemnity and defense, Clancy has not demonstrated the presence of sufficient aggravating factors, nor an opinion that Westchester’s actions were not reasonable or appropriate within industry practices, and summary judgment in favor of Westchester is appropriate on Clancy’s tortious breach of contract claim.

A year later, in a bench trial as to the remaining issues, the district court found Westchester owed Clancy coverage for its portion of the loss, less its deductible, plus applicable interest. Westchester appealed and Clancy cross- appealed. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the bench trial judgment on the contract claim, rejecting Westchester’s argument that the joint venture’s liability was separate and distinct from the liability of each of its members. As to the bad faith claim based upon delays in Westchester’s investigation, the Fourth Circuit concluded summary judgment in favor of Westchester was proper, relying on North Carolina law requiring, “malice, oppression, willfulness [or] reckless indifference to consequences” in order to establish tortious breach of contract.

Though an unpublished decision, Westchester reflects a North Carolina trend; delay-based extra-contractual claims in construction defect cases do not end well for the insured. The procedural history of Westchester demonstrates a common pattern and the court’s opinion demonstrates a frequent result.

My Roof, My Rules: Arbitrators May Determine Their Own Jurisdiction When the Parties Delegate that Authority

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Amandeep S. Kahlon | Buildsmart | September 20, 2017

An issue that repeatedly comes up in construction disputes is the scope of an arbitration agreement. Courts generally interpret agreements to arbitrate broadly, and, where the arbitrability of a specific claim has been at issue, courts often defer, allowing such questions to be answered by the arbitrator. One recent opinion from the Ninth Circuit followed this general approach.

In Portland General Electric Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insur. Co., an owner contracted with a general contractor to construct a power plant in Oregon. The work started in 2013. In the contract, the parties consented to the exclusive jurisdiction of any federal court in Oregon. The contract also required a performance bond, and the bond agreement included a statement that “any proceeding, legal or equitable, under this bond may be instituted in any court of competent jurisdiction in the location in which the work or part of the work is located.”

In addition to the bonding requirement, the owner also required the contractor to obtain a written guaranty of performance from its parent company. In the guaranty, the owner and parent company consented to submit any disputes in connection with the guaranty to binding arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules. The guaranty also specified that, once the arbitration proceeding was commenced, either party could implead any other entity (with its consent) in, and/or raise any claim against, any other entity provided such claim arose out of or in connection with an agreement with a subcontractor or the guaranty.

On December 18, 2015, the owner terminated the general contractor. In response, the contractor’s parent company filed a demand for arbitration. The contractor claimed it had not defaulted, that the termination was wrongful, and that the owner was due nothing under the guaranty agreement. Shortly thereafter, the parent company impleaded the surety under the performance bond invoking the impleader provision of the guaranty agreement and Article 7 of the ICC Rules. The surety consented and sought relief similar to that of the parent company.

The owner objected to the inclusion of the surety and sought a preliminary injunction in federal district court to prohibit joinder of the surety into the arbitration. The owner claimed that the contractor’s parent company had improperly impleaded the surety as part of a collusive effort to arbitrate claims that the owner and surety had agreed to litigate in Oregon courts. The district court granted the injunction, and the surety appealed.

On appeal, the surety argued that the owner’s election to arbitrate in the guaranty agreement and the ICC Rules left the issue of arbitrability of a particular claim up to the arbitrator and not the district court. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the surety, reversed the district court’s decision, and remanded the question of whether the surety’s claims could be arbitrated to the ICC arbitrator.  The Ninth Circuit noted that “parties may delegate the adjudication of gateway issues such as arbitrability of claims to the arbitrator if they clearly and unmistakably agree to do so.” The court then determined that the incorporation of the ICC Rules into the guaranty accomplished just such a delegation, where the rules expressly set forth in Article 6(3) that the arbitral tribunal had the power and authority to determine its own jurisdiction over a particular claim or question. The court reached this conclusion even though neither the performance bond nor the construction contract provided for any agreement to arbitrate disputes between the surety and the owner.

The Ninth Circuit showed deference to the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, and the court’s decision highlights the importance of dispute provisions in contracts, even when found in exhibits or addenda incorporated by reference (e.g., bond or guaranty agreements). Here, the owner likely did not anticipate addressing any claims under the bonds in arbitration, but, because of the guaranty’s broad impleader language and its incorporation of the ICC Rules, the owner ended up in a disfavored forum. And, although the arbitrator may later determine he or she lacks jurisdiction over the surety’s claims, when give the opportunity, arbitrators often reach the opposite conclusion and find a claim arbitrable. Given that reality, the Portland General Electric case demonstrates that all construction industry participants should be mindful of the deference courts will give to arbitrators when determining the arbitrability of claims.

The Use of Shrink Wrap on Roofs

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Steven Thomas | Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog | September 7, 2017

I have seen a trend lately which occurs after severe weather impacts an area and damage has been caused by either hail, wind, or extreme amounts of rain (like what I witnessed this past week in Texas), and Contractors have been applying shrink wrap to roofs. Apparently, they use shrink wrap to prevent water from entering the building. When you have a leaky roof, it is costly to repair and annoying to say the least! And yes, shrink wrap can certainly provide a temporary relief from the immediate problem of water coming into the structure; however, every novel idea has its problems too!

Before you allow anyone to shrink wrap your roof, here are a few good suggestions I have for you:

  1. Make certain that you take plenty of photos of any damage that may exist. These photos are essential to justify the installation of the shrink wrap. If you are expecting your insurance carrier to pay for the cost of the shrink wrap covering, it is fair to show them why it was needed.
  2. If a contractor in Texas guarantees that the Insurance Company will PAY for the shrink wrap, they could be violating Texas Insurance laws. Furthermore, ask to look at the photos of damage. If they do not provide you with any photos clearly illustrating the suspected damage, then more likely than not, they are shrink wrapping your roof for no good reason. You could be out thousands of dollars for something you did not need.
  3. With an historic rain event such as the one in Texas this week, water can find numerous ways to enter a structure. Often, it is not from a failed roofing system but a mechanical component on the roof such as an AC unit, grease trap, vent pipe, etc. These components could be the reason water entered the building. I have been performing roof moisture surveys (leak detection) for 25 years and many leaks I find are not from the roofing system, but rather from some mechanical component on the roof. It is always recommended to have someone evaluate your roof with nothing to gain by what they find!
  4. Make certain that the contractor you select to install the shrink wrap has a long record of working in your area. After a storm event, you will inevitably have a plethora of storm chasers in your area offering their services. Many of these companies prey upon the desperation of the consumer in need. As ridiculous as this may sound, Texas has no licensing for roofing contractors so you cannot simply file a complaint against their license.

As we have witnessed through news coverage, catastrophic events can bring out the best in people. Unfortunately, it can also bring out the worst from unscrupulous people as well. The old age adage of “if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is” still rings true today.