Colorado Defective Construction is Not Considered “Property Damage”

SDV Insights

In the July 5, 2022, case of Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Houston Casualty Co., the United States District Court for Colorado addressed the issue of whether damage to defectively installed balconies is considered “property damage” under Colorado law, requiring payment by a commercial general liability policy.

Facts of the Case

The case stems from a construction project where a subcontractor improperly installed balconies on an apartment complex. The owner of the project secured commercial general liability (CGL) coverage through an OCIP insured by Houston Casualty Company (HHC). The OCIP insured the general contractor and subcontractors. The general contractor also purchased a subcontractor default insurance policy insured by Indian Harbor.

All parties agreed that the subcontractor improperly installed portions of various balconies, including flashing, water-proof sealing, and water-resistant barriers, among other defects with the installation process. The parties also agreed that other portions of the balconies were properly installed. However, in order to repair the defects in the installations, every bit of each balcony had to be torn off and re-constructed.

The OCIP provides coverage to the subcontractor for “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of `bodily injury’ or `property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” However, the standard “your work” and “business risk” exclusions commonly found in CGL policies (exclusions j, k, and l) were removed from the HCC policy.

The Indian Harbor subcontractor default insurance policy also insured the loss, providing coverage for indemnification of “Loss,” which was defined as “costs and expenses paid by (the general contractor) to the extent caused by a Default of Performance of a Subcontractor/Supplier under the terms of a Covered Subcontract.” After paying the general contractor for the default claim, Indian Harbor brought suit to recover from the subcontractor’s liability insurer, which was HCC.  

Ultimately, HCC denied any coverage under its policy based upon the argument that there was no “property damage” as defined under their policy. HCC’s argument was that the damage that everyone agreed happened was damage to the subcontractor’s defective work itself, and therefore, did not qualify as “property damage” under the terms of the CGL policy. Eventually, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.

If There Is No “Property Damage,” There Is No Coverage

The court begins its analysis by stating that the first issue to determine is “whether the installation of the defective balconies constitutes ‘property damage’ under the HCC CGL policy and Colorado law.” The court indicated that without the existence of “property damage,” one never gets to the issue of whether there was an “occurrence” or an “accident.” HCC’s CGL policy defines “property damage” as “[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property.”

The court first addresses Indian Harbor’s argument that Colorado’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA) should resolve the issue in its favor. Since its passage in 2010, many parties to these types of cases have made an argument about the CDARA and that it should be conclusive on the issue of defective work being covered. However, this has not been the case.

The court quickly dismissed the CDARA argument as premature. Indian Harbor cites the language of the act which states, “work that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself, is an accident unless the property damage was expected or intended by the insured.” (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-808(3)). In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that it was irrelevant as to whether there was an accident or occurrence without first determining whether there is “property damage” as defined in the HCC policy. It would be premature to discuss whether there was an accident or occurrence before first addressing whether there was property damage, because if there is no property damage, there is no coverage.

The court referenced the 2012 Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., where an insurer refused to indemnify a general contractor for losses resulting from demolishing and replacing an improperly constructed pool. In Colorado Pool Systems, the court held that a CGL policy did not cover the cost of replacing the defectively built pool but did cover any necessary “rip and tear” damage to non-defective areas necessary for the defective pool replacement. The court did not apply the CDARA because the contract in the case was negotiated and signed prior to the statute’s enactment. However, in dicta, the Colorado Pool court stated that, “[t]he statute’s effect is clear enough. If we were to apply it, we would presume that the CGL policy covered damage that resulted from [the general contractor’s] defective workmanship.” The Indian Harbor court dismissed this as mere dicta and chose not to consider it.

The Indian Harbor court also cited the 2017 case of Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. v. Colclasure, where the Colorado federal district court applied Colorado Pool, holding that damage for repair and replacement of a defective arena roof was not considered “property damage” and thus is not covered under a CGL policy. Although, in Peerless, that court did agree that the CDARA applied, and property damage caused by defective workmanship was covered. But the court went on to conclude that “property damage” does not include costs of repair or replacement of defective workmanship but does include consequential damage to other parts of the property.

Based upon Colorado Pool and Peerless, the court denied Indian Harbor’s summary judgment motion and granted HCC’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

The Bottom Line

The court’s holding in this case, as well as the holding in Peerless, is contrary to the legislative intent of the CDARA. Section 13–20–808 of the CDARA was enacted in response to the General Security Indemnity Co. v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. case. In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that faulty workmanship, standing alone, is not an “accident” and that a construction defect is not an “occurrence.” In enacting Section 13-20-808, the legislature’s intent was clear that it considered a construction defect as an occurrence and that defective work should be covered by a CGL policy, unless and until it was excluded by another provision of the policy.

Specifically, the statute states the following in Section 13-20-808(1)(b)(III): “The decision of the Colorado court of appeals in General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009) does not properly consider a construction professional’s reasonable expectation that an insurer would defend the construction professional against an action or notice of claim contemplated by this part 8.”

Then, in Section 13-20-808(3), the statute states:

“(3) In interpreting a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, a court shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured. Nothing in this subsection (3):

(a) Requires coverage for damage to an insured’s own work unless otherwise provided in the insurance policy; or

(b) Creates insurance coverage that is not included in the insurance policy.”

The Indian Harbor decision basically says that defective workmanship is not “property damage” that should be considered under the CDARA. This begs the question, if defective work will not be considered “property damage,” then why enact the CDARA to begin with? The CDARA was specifically enacted to overturn the holding of General Security and declare that faulty workmanship should be covered by a CGL.

SDV will monitor future decisions out of Colorado to see how this statute is used (or not used) in dealing with coverage of construction defects as occurrences and faulty workmanship.

Shortly after this decision was reached, the parties in this case reached a settlement.  


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Colorado Defective Construction is Not Considered “Property Damage”

Saxe Doernberger & Vita

In the July 5, 2022, case of Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Houston Casualty Co., the United States District Court for Colorado addressed the issue of whether damage to defectively installed balconies is considered “property damage” under Colorado law, requiring payment by a commercial general liability policy.

Facts of the Case

The case stems from a construction project where a subcontractor improperly installed balconies on an apartment complex. The owner of the project secured commercial general liability (CGL) coverage through an OCIP insured by Houston Casualty Company (HHC). The OCIP insured the general contractor and subcontractors. The general contractor also purchased a subcontractor default insurance policy insured by Indian Harbor.

All parties agreed that the subcontractor improperly installed portions of various balconies, including flashing, water-proof sealing, and water-resistant barriers, among other defects with the installation process. The parties also agreed that other portions of the balconies were properly installed. However, in order to repair the defects in the installations, every bit of each balcony had to be torn off and re-constructed.

The OCIP provides coverage to the subcontractor for “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of `bodily injury’ or `property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” However, the standard “your work” and “business risk” exclusions commonly found in CGL policies (exclusions j, k, and l) were removed from the HCC policy.

The Indian Harbor subcontractor default insurance policy also insured the loss, providing coverage for indemnification of “Loss,” which was defined as “costs and expenses paid by (the general contractor) to the extent caused by a Default of Performance of a Subcontractor/Supplier under the terms of a Covered Subcontract.” After paying the general contractor for the default claim, Indian Harbor brought suit to recover from the subcontractor’s liability insurer, which was HCC.  

Ultimately, HCC denied any coverage under its policy based upon the argument that there was no “property damage” as defined under their policy. HCC’s argument was that the damage that everyone agreed happened was damage to the subcontractor’s defective work itself, and therefore, did not qualify as “property damage” under the terms of the CGL policy. Eventually, both parties filed motions for summary judgment.

If There Is No “Property Damage,” There Is No Coverage

The court begins its analysis by stating that the first issue to determine is “whether the installation of the defective balconies constitutes ‘property damage’ under the HCC CGL policy and Colorado law.” The court indicated that without the existence of “property damage,” one never gets to the issue of whether there was an “occurrence” or an “accident.” HCC’s CGL policy defines “property damage” as “[p]hysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property.”

The court first addresses Indian Harbor’s argument that Colorado’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA) should resolve the issue in its favor. Since its passage in 2010, many parties to these types of cases have made an argument about the CDARA and that it should be conclusive on the issue of defective work being covered. However, this has not been the case.

The court quickly dismissed the CDARA argument as premature. Indian Harbor cites the language of the act which states, “work that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself, is an accident unless the property damage was expected or intended by the insured.” (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-808(3)). In rejecting this argument, the court reasoned that it was irrelevant as to whether there was an accident or occurrence without first determining whether there is “property damage” as defined in the HCC policy. It would be premature to discuss whether there was an accident or occurrence before first addressing whether there was property damage, because if there is no property damage, there is no coverage.

The court referenced the 2012 Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Co., where an insurer refused to indemnify a general contractor for losses resulting from demolishing and replacing an improperly constructed pool. In Colorado Pool Systems, the court held that a CGL policy did not cover the cost of replacing the defectively built pool but did cover any necessary “rip and tear” damage to non-defective areas necessary for the defective pool replacement. The court did not apply the CDARA because the contract in the case was negotiated and signed prior to the statute’s enactment. However, in dicta, the Colorado Pool court stated that, “[t]he statute’s effect is clear enough. If we were to apply it, we would presume that the CGL policy covered damage that resulted from [the general contractor’s] defective workmanship.” The Indian Harbor court dismissed this as mere dicta and chose not to consider it.

The Indian Harbor court also cited the 2017 case of Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. v. Colclasure, where the Colorado federal district court applied Colorado Pool, holding that damage for repair and replacement of a defective arena roof was not considered “property damage” and thus is not covered under a CGL policy. Although, in Peerless, that court did agree that the CDARA applied, and property damage caused by defective workmanship was covered. But the court went on to conclude that “property damage” does not include costs of repair or replacement of defective workmanship but does include consequential damage to other parts of the property.

Based upon Colorado Pool and Peerless, the court denied Indian Harbor’s summary judgment motion and granted HCC’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

The Bottom Line

The court’s holding in this case, as well as the holding in Peerless, is contrary to the legislative intent of the CDARA. Section 13–20–808 of the CDARA was enacted in response to the General Security Indemnity Co. v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. case. In that case, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that faulty workmanship, standing alone, is not an “accident” and that a construction defect is not an “occurrence.” In enacting Section 13-20-808, the legislature’s intent was clear that it considered a construction defect as an occurrence and that defective work should be covered by a CGL policy, unless and until it was excluded by another provision of the policy.

Specifically, the statute states the following in Section 13-20-808(1)(b)(III): “The decision of the Colorado court of appeals in General Security Indemnity Company of Arizona v. Mountain States Mutual Casualty Company, 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009) does not properly consider a construction professional’s reasonable expectation that an insurer would defend the construction professional against an action or notice of claim contemplated by this part 8.”

Then, in Section 13-20-808(3), the statute states:

“(3) In interpreting a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, a court shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured. Nothing in this subsection (3):

(a) Requires coverage for damage to an insured’s own work unless otherwise provided in the insurance policy; or

(b) Creates insurance coverage that is not included in the insurance policy.”

The Indian Harbor decision basically says that defective workmanship is not “property damage” that should be considered under the CDARA. This begs the question, if defective work will not be considered “property damage,” then why enact the CDARA to begin with? The CDARA was specifically enacted to overturn the holding of General Security and declare that faulty workmanship should be covered by a CGL.

SDV will monitor future decisions out of Colorado to see how this statute is used (or not used) in dealing with coverage of construction defects as occurrences and faulty workmanship.

Shortly after this decision was reached, the parties in this case reached a settlement.  


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Illinois Appellate Court Addresses Professional Services Exclusion in Homeowners Policy

James M. Eastham | Traub Lieberman

In Stonegate Ins. Co. v. Smith, 2022 IL App (1st) 210931, the Insured was performing plumbing work at a multi-story townhouse when a fire ensued causing damage to the second story unit. Although a carpenter by trade, the Insured was performing plumbing work consisting of the replacement of a shower valve as a favor for a friend. To accomplish the task, the Insured utilized a small propane torch to attempt to remove the old water piping to the shower. In doing so, the insulation behind the bathroom wall caught fire and the flame spread upward to the neighboring unit. Stonegate had issued a homeowner’s policy to the Insured during the relevant time period. The homeowner’s policy excluded coverage for property damage “[a]rising out of the rendering of or failure to render professional services.” Subsequent to tender of the loss, Stonegate initiated a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it owned no duty to defend or indemnity pursuant to the professional services exclusions.

In finding in favor of the Insured, the Court began its analysis by noting that the homeowner’s policy did not define the term “professional services” such that it was the Court’s task to determine whether the Insured’s work qualified as a “professional service” for purposes of the exclusion. The Court further prefaced its holding by stating that for an exclusionary clause to effectively deny coverage, its applicability must be clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured. Looking to Illinois case precedent, the Court found that the term “professional service” is not limited to services for which the person performing them must be licensed by a governmental authority. Rather, “professional services” encompass any business activity conducted by an insured that (1) involves specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and (2) is predominantly mental or intellectual as opposed to physical or manual in nature.

Turning to the facts of the matter at hand, the Court held that it was the Insured’s heating of the pipes which caused the property damage which Stonegate sought to exclude from coverage. Without discussion, the Court assumed that the heating of the pipes did require specialized knowledge, labor, or skill. Therefore, the question to be answered was whether the activity, was predominantly mental or intellectual as opposed to physical or manual in nature. In finding that the activity was predominantly physical in nature, the Court stated that “It would defy common sense to contend that using a flame to heat pipes is a predominantly mental or intellectual endeavor.” Correspondingly, the heating of the pipes did not constitute a “professional service” and the exclusion did not apply to preclude coverage.

The Court went on to temper its holding by stating that it was not stating that every type of work that could broadly be categorized as plumbing is per se outside the scope of “professional services”. As such, the Court confined its holding to the facts at hand encompassing the particular activity of heating pipes with a torch. It is also worth noting that the Court summarized its holding by stating: “In the case at bar, Smith was not a plumber and was to receive no money for his work, and as a result, the ‘professional services’ exclusion does not apply here.” Although the Court did not specifically address the Insured’s primary occupation or the lack of compensation in the main body of the analysis, the summary does potentially indicate that these additional factors may have played a role in the decision.


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Hold on Just One Second: Texas Clarifies Starting Point for Negligence Statute of Limitations

Lian Skaf | The Subrogation Strategist

In construction or similar ongoing projects, problems often pop up. Sometimes they can pop up again and again. Making things even more complicated, one problem may affect another, seemingly new problem. When these construction problems result in property damage, timelines tend to overlap and determining when a statute of limitation begins to run for a particular claim can be difficult. Especially in states with short statute of limitations for tort claims like Texas, knowing when a statute begins to run is crucial for a subrogation professional.

In Hussion St. Bldgs., LLC v. TRW Eng’rs, Inc., No. 14-20-00641-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 2193, 2022 WL 1010313, the Court of Appeals of Texas provided clarity on when the two-year statute of limitations for tort claims begins to run. Reversing the judgment from the lower court, the appellate court denied summary judgment to the defendant, holding that, despite there being existing issues with the ongoing construction project, the negligence cause of action for Hussion Street Buildings, LLC (Hussion) did not begin to run more than two years prior to filing suit.

This case arises from a housing development project undertaken by various parties, collectively referred to as the Housing County Housing Authority (HCHA). The project was known as the Fenix Estates Project and took place next door to real property and a warehouse owned by Hussion. HCHA retained Qualified Construction, Inc. (Qualified) to construct the project and TRW Engineers, Inc. (TRW) as the engineer for the project. In September of 2017, Qualified allegedly severed a sewer line to Hussion’s property and, in response, Hussion filed suit against Qualified and HCHA for injunctive relief. The court in that case denied the relief being sought by Hussion.

Construction on the Fenix Estates Project continued and TRW was tasked with providing a water detention program. According to Hussion, TRW failed to do so, resulting in water or mud intrusion onto its property beginning on May 5, 2018. Hussion filed suit against TRW in March of 2020 for negligence, gross negligence, professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty as a result of the property damage it sustained. TRW moved for summary judgment on the grounds, inter alia, that Hussion’s negligence claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The lower court granted summary judgment.

Hussion claimed that there were four separate occasions where water intruded onto its’ property as a result of TRW’s actions. TRW claimed that, because Hussion previously filed suit for injuries from the project in 2017, the statute of limitations began to run at that time and thus two years had already passed by the time it filed suit against TRW in 2020.

Because Hussion did not claim water damage in 2017, only threats of damage, the appellate court held that the statute did not begin to run at that time. Moreover, each of the four occasions on which Hussion claimed water damage occurred were within the two-year statute of limitations period. Thus, the negligence claim was not barred.

In its decision, the appellate court held that the statute of limitations does not run when damage to property is possible or even likely, but at the first occurrence. It further extrapolates that when there is an ongoing “nuisance” type claim, the first step in a statute of limitations analysis is to determine if the nuisance is temporary or permanent. If it is permanent, there is a single cause of action that runs when the injury is first discovered. If it is temporary, a new cause or action begins to run at each occurrence.

As all subrogation professionals know, having clarity on when a statute of limitations or statute of repose runs is not just important, but necessary for proper claim handling. When clarity is complicated by complex construction, diligent fact-finding becomes essential. Speaking with as many people as possible with knowledge of the facts of the claim will help establish a strong timeline upon which to base a statute of limitations analysis. Of course, when that information is not available either because it lies with adverse parties or some other reason, filing suit to stop the clock may be the safest approach.


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Fla. Court Clears Way for Video Recording of Adjuster’s Damage Inspections

William Rabb | Claims Journal

Homeowners and public adjusters may now feel a little more emboldened to record an insurance adjuster’s inspection of a home, after a Florida appeals court ruled in favor of the practice last week – the third such ruling in as many years.

The 4th District Court of Appeal, in West Palm Beach, held that because the American Strategic Insurance Corp. policy does not address the question of video and audio recording of an inspection, the case should be remanded and reconsidered. The court reversed a Palm Beach County trial court’s 2021 ruling in favor of the insurer, which found that the insurance policy did not authorize the filming of the insurer’s inspector.

“We conclude that nothing on this record precludes an insured from recording an insurance adjuster’s inspection while in the insured’s own home,” 3rd DCA Judge Martha Warner wrote in the opinion. “The trial court erred in entering declaratory judgment for the insurer.”

American Strategic, a Progressive Insurance Co. subsidiary based in St. Petersburg, argued that the HO policy did not permit the recording of its inspector. But the appellate court found that the policy did not forbid it, either. The judges noted that courts have consistently held that any ambiguity in a policy must be strictly construed in favor of the insured “and strictly against the insurer.”

An oft-quoted 1976 opinion from the 4th DCA said: “Where a contract is simply silent as to a particular matter, that is, its language neither expressly nor by reasonable implication indicates that the parties intended to contract with respect to the matter, the court should not, under the guise of construction, impose contractual rights and duties on the parties which they themselves omitted.”

More recent rulings from the 4th DCA and the 3rd DCA have found that an insurance adjuster has no legitimate expectation of privacy while in an insured’s home. In Silversmith vs. State Farm Insurance, the 4th District found in 2021 that Florida law, which prohibits audio recordings unless both parties agree, does not apply to an insurance inspection scenario. A year earlier, the 3rd District Court of Appeals declined to review a trial court order that allowed a recording of an inspection.

Those rulings rested in part on a 1994 Florida Supreme Court decision that persons objecting to being recorded in most cases must state “an actual subjective expectation of privacy,” and a societal recognition that the expection is reasonable.

pastedGraphic.pngIn the American Strategic case, homeowners Ryan and Andrea Gesten suffered damage to their home from a plumbing problem in 2019, the court explained. Ryan Gesten, himself a trial attorney experienced in insurance claims litigation, hired a public adjuster to assist in the claim. The claim totaled $81,000.

The public adjuster informed the insurer that he would be recording the carrier’s home inspection.

“This is being done for the benefit of transparency and accountability for both parties,” the public adjuster wrote to the insurance company.

American Strategic objected to the audio recording. On the day of the planned inspection, ASI’s attorney, its adjuster and an independent expert showed up at the property. The public adjuster had a camera strapped on. The ASI lawyer objected and the parties could not come to terms. The inspection was never completed, the court explained.

ASI then petitioned the trial court to bar the audio recording. The Gestens sued for breach of contract. The Palm Beach court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier, and the appeal followed.

The court opinion and the original suit filed by ASI explain that ASI argued that the recording would violate the policy and state law, and that the insurer had no way to record the public adjuster’s inspection. And because ASI’s lawyer was present, that would create an attorney-client communications that should not be filmed, the complaint said.

“Finally, there is a genuine concern (over) what the public adjuster may do with the images and audio tape of these individuals,” ASI’s petition reads.

There’s also the fact that the homeowners’ public adjuster was Scott David Thomas, a man who has become notorious in the Florida insurance industry for making things difficult for insurance company adjusters and experts in recent years. The state Department of Financial Services, which regulates agents and adjusters, in March of this year filed an administrative complaint against Thomas, charging him with repeatedly stonewalling insurance company adjusters on property inspections.

In some instances, Thomas became belligerent and disparaging toward Citizens Property Insurance adusters and other adjusters, refused to answer questions, demanded proof of the other inspectors’ workers’ compensation insurance, requested background checks on inspectors, often changed agreed-on inspection dates and refused to meet except on Saturdays. Thomas could ultimately lose his license if an administrative ruling goes against him.

The appeals court decision in the ASI case may not settle the audio-recording question completely. Samuel Alexander, the appeals lawyer for the homeowners who was also the attorney in the 2021 Silversmith case, pointed out that the concurring-but-dissenting opinion by 4th DCA Judge Mark Klingensmith took issue with his colleagues’ reliance on the Silversmith decision.

The Silversmith opinion “is in direct conflict not only with the statute with our prior decisions” in two other cases, Klingensmith wrote. Florida law’s prohibition on recording without a subject’s consent “prohibits what the appellees want to do,” and provides no exception for business interactions or for when an adjuster is in someone’s home.

That could crack the door open for further litigation on the issue in coming years, partly because American Strategic’s lawyers did not raise some issues at the trial court level.

“Because our opinion here does not explicitly rest on Silversmith as controlling precedent, we do not need to revisit Silversmith for the purposes of deciding this matter,” Klingensmith wrote. “However, in the future, I would consider doing so in an appropriate case.”

When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.