Coverage Construction: Arizona Supreme Court’s Osborn III Opinion

Creighton Dixon, Jeffrey Porter and Lynsie Zona | Snell & Wilmer

In Fidelity National v. Osborn III Partners LLC, the Arizona Supreme Court recently decided the question of whether mechanics’ liens filed by a general contractor are a construction lender’s “own darn fault” if the liens result in part from the lender discontinuing advances of loan proceeds to be used to pay the mechanics’ lien claimant. We’ve gathered members of our commercial finance and construction teams to help explain what the decision means for lenders, borrowers, owners, developers, and contractors.

Summary of the Opinion

The standard ALTA form of title insurance policy excludes from its coverage any defects, liens or encumbrances that were created, assumed or agreed by the insured. As the Arizona Supreme Court notes, this exclusion – “Exclusion 3(a)” – is meant to exclude coverage for matters that are the insured’s “own darn fault.”

In Osborn III, the construction lender, Mortgages Limited (“ML”), entered into a loan agreement with a developer to provide a loan for the construction of a condominium project, secured by a first deed of trust on the project. Two years later, in mid-2008, the developer defaulted by failing to make an interest payment, and ML ceased funding the loan. As a result, the general contractor for the project – Summit Builders (“Summit”) – was not paid in full and recorded a mechanics’ lien against the project. That same summer, ML went into bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy court created several LLCs – including Osborn III Loan LLC (“Osborn”) – to hold ML’s existing loans. As successor-in-interest to the lender, Osborn became the insured party on the title policy. Summit sued to enforce its mechanics’ lien at the end of December 2008. 

The title policy expressly provided for coverage if the lender’s deed of trust did not have priority over mechanics’ liens arising from work related to the project that was commenced before the policy date, even though work had indeed already begun prior to the loan closing. Although the Court did not specify the source of this coverage, filings with the Arizona Court of Appeals cite Covered Risk 11 (a) of the title policy, which protects against loss caused by lack of priority of the deed of trust caused by a mechanics’ lien for work that commenced on or before the date the deed of trust is recorded. Perhaps with that understanding, the lender settled Summit’s claims and sought coverage under its title policy.  

Fidelity denied the lender’s claim, however, arguing that the lender triggered Exclusion 3(a) because the lender’s decision to withhold project funding “created” the mechanics’ liens. 

Rejecting two frameworks established by federal courts, Arizona’s Supreme Court held that its prior opinion in a homeowner’s title insurance claim matter provided appropriate guidance in disputes as to the application of title policy Exclusion 3(a) in the context of construction lending in its recent Osborn III opinion. Accordingly, Arizona courts will rely on a causation framework to determine if the insured “created” or “suffered” a defect, encumbrance, or adverse claim – such as a mechanics’ lien – excluded from insurance coverage by Exclusion 3(a).

The Osborn III Court relied on its prior opinion in First American Title Insurance Co. v. Action Acquisitions, LLC, in which the Court held the created-risk exclusion in the purchaser’s homeowner’s title policy applied to its loss of title when the purchaser paid a grossly inadequate price for the home at a sheriff’s sale, which led to the sale being set aside. As in Action Acquisitions, the Fidelity National Court found the language of the title policy exclusion to be unambiguous, meaning that Exclusion 3(a) is applicable if the insured’s actions caused or allowed the defect. Significantly, this analysis does not consider the insured’s intent in creating the defect or whether the insured engaged in misconduct – such as a contractual breach – related to the defect.

The rejected federal frameworks would have imposed other factors into the analysis into application of Exclusion 3(a). However, the Osborn III Court opted instead for a causation framework, similar to a proximate cause analysis in tort law, which relies on examining the sequence of events: The insurer has the burden of proving that the insured’s actions actually caused a defect, encumbrance, or adverse claim so as to trigger Exclusion 3(a).

What does Osborn III mean for Lenders and Borrowers?

This decision will have ongoing relevance for construction lenders. Although the title policy in Osborn III was issued nearly 17 years ago, Exclusion 3(a) and Covered Risk 11(a) remain essentially the same despite ALTA’s recent revisions to its form policies.

The Osborn III Court was clear: Timing is key when it comes to Exclusion 3(a). The current economic climate is prompting construction lenders to look closer at the default provisions in their loan documents, and although construction lenders are always concerned with ensuring loan advances are used to pay contractors, Exclusion 3(a) provides one further reason.

What does Osborn III mean for the Construction Industry?

Osborn III is a 2023 opinion about a 2008 dispute. And even more dramatically – the matter is still not resolved! The Supreme Court remanded to the trial court to evaluate three factual issues. This opinion is a timely reminder that in order to avoid decades (plural) of litigation, keep good records. For example, the Court could not determine on the record before it the key timeline of events (e.g., did Developer fail to pay Contractor because Lender withheld funding, or did Developer fail to pay Contractor before Lender withheld funds). A clear record will help facilitate resolution of disputes. This is important as nearly everyone is better off promptly resolving a dispute and getting back to their respective core businesses (e.g., construction or lending, not litigating). 


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Arizona’s Implied Warranty of Workmanship and Habitability Cannot Be Disclaimed or Waived Under Any Circumstance

Jason Feld and Stephanie Wilson | Kahana Feld

Arizona residential construction and single-family home production is growing at a rapid pace. And just as fast as the homes are sold, homeowners are constantly seeking warranty repairs from their homebuilders. Despite having strong purchase documents with express warranty language, the Arizona Supreme Court in Zambrano v. M & RC, II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53 (2022) adopted a bright line rule that regardless of the contract, the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability (“implied warranty”) cannot be disclaimed or waived under any circumstance.  The Arizona Supreme Court opinion provides clear guidance of the law in this area on the scope of the implied warranty in contracts between homebuyers and builder/vendors, specifically on the issue of whether an express warranty can negate and effectively waive the common law implied warranty – which is a definitive violation of public policy.

The Zambrano decision involved a licensed real estate broker who bought a new single family home for herself in a newly constructed master planned community in Surprise, AZ. Zambrano entered into a valid sales contract with Scott Homes (homebuilder) which contained a stand-alone 45-page pre-printed form express warranty. The express warranty was to be the “only warranty applicable to the home.”  The contract further clarified that the buyer was expressly disclaiming (and, thus, waiving) the implied warranty. The sales documents and express warranty were signed and authorized by Zambrano. A short time later, the home developed alleged “design and construction defects” that were “either time barred or outside the coverage” of the express warranty. Zambrano filed suit for the alleged defects based on the implied warranty. Scott Homes filed summary judgment based on the Zambrano’s waiver and disclaimer of the implied warranty in the purchase agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment and the matter was appealed up to the Arizona Supreme Court.

The Arizona Supreme Court decided the issue if an express warranty can essentially trump the common law implied warranty. The Court adopted a bright line rule holding that any disclaimer or waiver of the implied warranty is unenforceable as matter of law and as a matter of public policyThe Court further held that the implied warranty could not be disclaimed or waived unless and until the Arizona legislature expressly declared it to be a right that buyers could waive or disclaim. The Court concluded that “[e]enforcing the disclaimer and waiver here would grievously injure homebuyers and the public welfare as doing so would likely spell the end of the implied warranty . . . .”   The Court acknowledged that it had “considered leaving open the possibility that a sophisticated homebuyer in some settings could negotiate to waive the implied warranty,” but rejected “that idea.”  The Court observed that “it would be next to impossible for courts to decide whether a homebuyer was sophisticated enough” and the Court nevertheless concluded that “even sophisticated homebuyers need the protection offered by the implied warranty.” 

Interestingly, the dissent relied upon long-established public policy behind the freedom to contract and a “sophisticated” homebuyer who “seeks to purchase a customized home that presents specific risks for which the homebuyer prefers to negotiate unique coverage in an express warranty.” The dissent went further to state “a homebuyer who prefers a contractual term that is less protective than the implied warranty as to one section or component of the home, in exchange for greater and broader protection in another area of the home,” and a homebuyer who “negotiate[s] a reduced purchase price in exchange for a warranty more limited than the implied warranty.” However, the majority of the Court emphatically deferred any change in the law on circumventing the common law and public policy implications of implied warranty to the legislature.

The major take-away is that without legislative intervention, the implied warranty cannot be waived, disclaimed or modified under any circumstances in Arizona irrespective of a valid contract and express warranty.


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

The Unwavering Un-waivable Implied Warranty of Workmanship and Habitability in Arizona

Robert A. Henry and Emily R. Parker | Snell & Wilmer

The Arizona Supreme Court recently issued an opinion on the scope of the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability (the “implied warranty”) in contracts between homebuyers and builder/vendors that provides clear guidance of the law in this area, specifically on the issue of whether the implied warranty can be waived or disclaimed.   It is also an interesting and helpful read for those who engage in new home residential sales and real estate transactions generally.  

The case: Zambrano v. M & RC, II LLC, 254 Ariz. 53 (2022). The takeaway holding: the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability cannot, under any circumstances, be disclaimed or waived.  

From a practice perspective, the foregoing is likely all one needs to ultimately know.  However, the majority opinion (authored by Justice Timmer) and the dissent (authored by Justice King, and joined by Justice Bolick) are in these authors’ opinions worth a read for those who want a better understanding of the contours of how “public policy” plays into the analysis of the enforceability of contract terms, especially in the real estate context and even more particularly in connection with contracts for the sale of new homes. The careful analysis of both the majority opinion and the dissent provides an excellent history of the implied warranty, the public policy behind it, and its scope and application in the context of competing public policies, most notably the freedom to contract. 

Zambrano involved a buyer (whom the dissent observes was herself a licensed real estate broker) who purchased a new home in a “new subdivision” via a sales contract that included an express warranty from the builder relating to the home. The express warranty (contained in a separate forty-page preprinted form) was to be the “only warranty applicable” to the home.  The contract further clarified that the buyer was  expressly disclaiming (and, thus, waiving) the implied warranty. The home subsequently developed alleged “design and construction defects” that were “either time barred or outside the coverage” of the express warranty.  The buyer thus filed suit for the alleged defects based on the implied warranty, and the trial court granted summary judgment to the builder based on the buyer’s waiver/disclaimer of the implied warranty in the purchase agreement.     

After a thorough analysis of the issues and arguments, the Arizona Supreme Court decided to adopt a bright line rule.  It held that the disclaimer—any disclaimer or waiver—of the implied warranty is unenforceable as matter of law—as a matter of public policy and the common law—in Arizona.  The Court further held that the implied warranty could not be disclaimed or waived unless and until the Arizona legislature expressly declared it to be a right that buyers could waive or disclaim.  The Court concluded that “[e]nforcing the disclaimer and waiver here would grievously injure homebuyers and the public welfare as doing so would likely spell the end of the implied warranty . . . .”   The Court acknowledged that it had “considered leaving open the possibility that a sophisticated homebuyer in some settings could negotiate to waive the implied warranty,” but rejected “that idea.”  The Court observed that “it would be next to impossible for courts to decide whether a homebuyer was sophisticated enough” and the Court nevertheless concluded that “[e]ven sophisticated homebuyers need the protection offered by the implied warranty.” 

The dissent took issue with this analysis and, in particular, the Court’s bright line rule.  Relying on the long-established public policy behind the freedom to contract, among other things, the dissent appeared troubled by the Court’s intrusion into “the parties’ ability to determine their own best interests” in the contractual context, and in particular when parties agree to an express warranty in lieu of the implied warranty.  The dissent, for example, listed hypotheticals that it believed should not cause concern to anyone, from a public policy perspective or otherwise.  For example, a “sophisticated” homebuyer who “seeks to purchase a customized home that presents specific risks for which the homebuyer prefers to negotiate unique coverage in an express warranty,” “a homebuyer who prefers a contractual term that is less protective than the implied warranty as to one section or component of the home, in exchange for greater and broader protection in another area of the home,” and a homebuyer who “negotiate[s] a reduced purchase price in exchange for a warranty more limited than the implied warranty.” 

The back and forth between the majority and the dissent on the issues goes on.  But ultimately (and unless and until the legislature says otherwise) the law is clear.  Caveat vendor: the implied warranty cannot be waived, disclaimed or modified in Arizona under any circumstances. 


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Public Policy Prevails: Homebuilders and Homebuyers Cannot Agree to Disclaim Implied Warranty of Habitability in Arizona

Ryan Bennett | The Subrogation Strategist

In Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC, et al., 2022 Ariz. LEXIS 309, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a homebuilder and homebuyer could not waive or disclaim the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. While the court would normally enforce a contract between two parties – even if one side made a “bad deal” – they will not do so if the contract’s terms are against public policy.

In this case, Tina Zambrano (Zambrano) signed a purchase agreement with the homebuilder to buy a newly built home. The agreement included provisions which expressly disclaimed any implied warranties, including the warranty of habitability and workmanship. After the purchase, Zambrano claimed that there were construction defects within the home, including popped nails in the drywall and issues with the home’s foundation. Zambrano sued the homebuilder for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability. The homebuilder moved for summary judgment based on the waivers within the contract and the trial court, agreeing that the waivers applied, dismissed the case. Zambrano appealed and the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court specifically explained that Arizona has a public policy interest in protecting consumers.

The Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the appellate court’s reversal and agreed that a waiver of the implied warranty of habitability and workmanship is against public policy. However, the state’s high court provided different reasoning than the appellate court for its holding. The court described, in depth, the “vastly unequal bargaining power, expertise, and knowledge” that exists between a homebuilder and homebuyer. The court went on to say that a homebuyer must heavily rely on the builder’s knowledge and skill. Further, homebuyers are not in a position to discover defects lurking within the walls, or those that are covered up during a normal home inspection. The court noted that if such warranty disclaimers were allowed, homebuilders would surely place the provision within every contract, leading to homes potentially sitting in disrepair forever. Further, public policy promotes builders using minimum standards of good workmanship, which conforms to a homebuyer’s reasonable expectations.

In continuing to uphold the implied warranty of workmanship and habitability, the Supreme Court of Arizona seeks to protect unknowing homebuyers from issues that might not reveal themselves for years. Thus, subrogation professionals practicing in Arizona and representing insured homebuyers should look for attempted contractual waivers of the warranty of workmanship and habitability and, if found, argue that the waivers are unenforceable because they are against public policy.


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.

Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Importance of Implied Warranties of Workmanship and Habitability

Creighton P. Dixon | Snell & Wilmer

In late September 2022, Arizona’s Supreme Court issued a new opinion important for any person or company working in residential construction. The Court’s opinion in Zambrano v. M & RC II LLC, et al affirms the importance of the implied warranties of workmanship and habitability for new home construction. The new opinion is consistent with the lower court of appeal’s conclusion, but provides significant analysis of the issue that may influence future cases. Here, following a brief summary of the case, we offer some initial takeaways.

Zambrano is about a dispute between a homebuyer and the homebuilder regarding the purchase of a new home. As a part of the purchase, the homebuyer signed a preprinted contract that attempted to disclaim or waive the implied warranties of workmanship and habitability.2 The homebuilder instead offered an express warranty. When issues developed with the home, the homebuyer filed a lawsuit to enforce the implied warranties of workmanship and habitability. Ultimately the Arizona Supreme Court determined and held that the implied warranties of workmanship and habitability cannot be waived. With that context, here are four things homebuilders (and buyers!) should note.

First, the opinion sets forth why the implied warranties of workmanship and habitability are critical. The opinion noted warranties of workmanship and habitability are important for homebuyers as their enforcement is usually the best vehicle for a homebuyer to sue their homebuilder. For various reasons, including the defense of the economic loss doctrine, homebuyers may not be able to sue but for the implied warranties. Theoretically, this could leave a homebuyer without any remedy at all if the new home was unlivable.

Second, and relatedly, the majority reflected on the limited remedies available for homebuyers who pursue a claim with the Registrar of Contractors. While some money may be recoverable (e.g. from the Residential Recovery Fund), it may not be sufficient to address a catastrophic problem with the home. Typical homeowners may struggle to decide whether a lawsuit or a complaint with the Registrar of Contractors is the appropriate way to advance their dispute as they compare the costs and timelines associated with the two forums. Though this opinion did not necessarily change that calculus, it does ensure and preserve that choice.

Third, the decision is likely limited to new construction. The majority’s opinion explains that the implied warranties of workmanship and habitability exist in part to protect home buyers who do not have full access to information. The opinion explained older homes are distinct because buyers can theoretically see how they have weathered over time.

Fourth, attorneys in Arizona should become familiar with the case. Both the majority’s opinion and dissent contain substantial analysis that will likely be cited in motions and briefs for years to come for many issues not even limited to construction. For example, the opinion will likely be cited to support an argument that a contract provision should not be enforced on policy grounds. With that in mind, we expect this summary of initial takeaways is only the beginning of the conversation about the Zambrano opinion and its importance going forward.


When one of your cases is in need of a construction expert, estimates, insurance appraisal or umpire services in defect or insurance disputes – please call Advise & Consult, Inc. at 888.684.8305, or email experts@adviseandconsult.net.